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ABM Study

Terms of Reference

The major objective of this study will be to analyze the time urgency of requirements for intelligence on Soviet ABM activities by identifying the cost to our own strategic programs of near term uncertainty about various aspects of Soviet ABM. In other words, the study will attempt to establish the usefulness of a particular kind of intelligence in terms of improving the ability of the user to make specific decisions now in prospect. At least four kinds of decisions will be

1. Force planning - The development and procurement of U.S. strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces are affected both by what we know and don't know about Soviet ABM, and by what we believe we will or won't know at some point in the future.

considered:

- 2. Force operations Different kinds of Soviet ABM will require different weapons targeting, penetration tactics, withholding doctrine, defensive commitments, and command and control functions.
- 3. Politics and diplomacy Decision-making in this area both leads and lags military affairs and a political leader may need additional information or the same information with greater reliability.
- 4. Intelligence The intelligence community has its own unique needs for information on Soviet ABM either as a corollary indicator of other current activities or as an investment for the future.



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Obviously then, the study must consider both the current and future time frames including estimate of when we might know certain things.

More specifically, the study should first establish the utility of information on different characteristics of Soviet ABM's. We need to know what information is vital and what information is almost irrelevant. These needs should be expressed by user, by time period, and by allowable uncertainty.

Next, the study should devise a model whereby ABM intelligence needs can be satisfied from observables, i.e., from raw data provided by current or potential intelligence collectors. This portion of the study should suggest redundancies and interactions between collectors, and the degree and type of processing and analysis that are needed for each collector.

Finally, the study should evaluate the performance, cost, and schedules for current and planned collection and processing in terms of

(1) their ability to satisfy the more important ABM needs and (2) their relative ability to satisfy other intelligence needs related to specific decisions about strategic forces.

This study should include full-time participation by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

These representatives should be authorized to task agencies within their department.